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Abstract 
 
In this study, I explored human decision making from three perspectives – the theory of planned 
behaviour, the affect heuristic and an embodied perspective. One hundred and forty six participants 
were recruited in Christchurch city in New Zealand and their commuting habits were investigated. The 
focus of this study was the choice to commute by bicycle or not.  In this study, the participants were 
assessed for their environmental beliefs or attitudes regarding cycling commuting, their affective 
reactions to cycling, their risk perception of cycling, their level of support of pro-cycling governmental 
policies, whether they commuted by bicycle or not, and a physiological measure that is indicative of 
exposure to foetal testosterone, the second to fourth digit ratio on their hands (2D:4D).  The results of 
a regression analysis revealed that environmental attitude is predictive of the level of support for pro-
cycling policies, in line with expectations from the theory of planned behaviour.  A regression analysis 
revealed that affective reactions to cycling, 2D:4D  and sex are predictive of risk perception of road 
cycling, in line with expectations based on the embodied and affect heuristic perspective. In addition, a 
logistic regression revealed that environmental attitudes, 2D:4D and sex are predictive of bicycle 
commuting behaviour. These findings suggest a composite decision making model that combines the 
theory of planned behaviour, the affect heuristic and embodiment may prove useful in understanding 
environmental decision making. In addition, the findings indicate the importance of embodiment in 
human decision making. 
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Introduction 
 
The emission of greenhouse gas is becoming a serious environmental issue. For example, in developed 
nations like Canada, the transportation sector contributes approximately twenty-six percent of 
greenhouse gas emissions (Ngo, West & Calkins, 2009). One of the most environmentally significant 
decisions individuals have to make is their transport choice for commuting (Collins & Chambers, 2005). 
 
Encouraging people to use bicycles as their means of daily commuting would improve local air quality; 
reduces greenhouse gas emissions, reduces the nation’s dependence on imported petrol/oil and, 
perhaps, even ease the burden of health care services in the long term, given the rising global 
epidemic of obesity and related health problems (Wooliscroft & Ganglmair, 2009; Wen & Rissel, 2008). 
Governments of many countries attempt to promote cycling in order to ease their existing traffic as 
well as environmental problems (e.g. Doolittle, & Porter, 1994; Foster, 2001; Martens, 2007). 
 
Christchurch, New Zealand is an ideal location for the use of bicycles for transportation. The geography 
within the city proper is relatively flat with a relatively mild climate (temperature ranging from a ‘Mean 
Daily Minimum’ of 1.9°C in the winter to a ‘Mean Daily Maximum’ of 22.5°C in the summer) (University 
of Canterbury Liaison Office, n.d.). However, according to the nationwide marketing survey done by 
Wooliscroft and Ganglmair (2009), the number of bicycle commuters in New Zealand is low, despite 
the fact that there are around a million bicycles in households in New Zealand. Wooliscroft and 
Ganglmair (2009) suggest that other drivers’ behaviour could be the major factor in preventing people 
from using bicycles, e.g. perceptions of road safety. Little research has, however, been conducted in 
New Zealand to determine the underlying psychological factors influencing the decision to use a 
bicycle for daily transportation. 
 
The present study represents an initial attempt to explore multiple decision making models in the 
context of the choice to commute by bicycle in Christchurch, NZ. There are three different perspectives 
of behavioural choice models that will be explored: the theory of planned behaviour, the affect 
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heuristic, and embodied decision making perspectives. These different perspectives were explored in a 
convenience sample in Christchurch. Our fundamental question is whether aspects of the different 
decision making perspectives could, when combined, explain whether someone choose to commute or 
not by bicycle.  
 
Decision making perspectives 
 
In the current study, pro-environmental behaviours are regarded as the actions to be taken after 
certain pro-environmental decisions were made. Various behaviour modification and decision making 
models will be discussed. 
 
Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
There are studies about pro-environmental behaviour and decision making that include cycling (e.g. 
Collins & Chambers, 2005; Monroe, 2003). Many pro-environmental behaviour researchers borrow 
existing psychological theories while others attempt to develop models specific to pro-environmental 
behaviours (Kollmuss, & Agyeman, 2002). According to the review done by Kollmuss and Agyeman 
(2002), none of the reviewed models are able to give a definitive explanation to the gap between pro-
environmental beliefs and attitudes (including pro-environmental knowledge and awareness) and 
actual pro-environmental behaviours. 
 
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) is a relatively popular theory among the behavioural choice 
models (Ajzen, 1991). In the TPB, a person's behaviour is guided by three belief structures: behavioural 
beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs. The behavioural beliefs reflect the person's individual 
attitude toward the behaviour (how they have assessed the behaviour’s positive or negative value). 
The normative belief is based on the person’s perceived social norms (what do others do and what is 
expected of the person). The control beliefs are the person’s assessments of whether they actually 
have volitional control over the behaviour. The latter should not be confused with actual volitional 
control, but is an assessment of perceived control. These beliefs themselves influence or cause the 
person’s behavioural intent and this in turn results in behavioural action. While not excluded explicitly 
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in the model, the TPB is extremely cerebral. The model is largely concerned with state-able beliefs and 
makes less room for non-verbal information.   
 
Hine, Marks, and colleagues (2007) recently challenge the effectiveness of the TPB in predicting pro-
environmental behaviours; they reckon TPB focuses exclusively on cognitive determinants of decision 
making and behaviour. In a similar way, Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) think TPB’s underlying 
assumption that people act rationally is a limitation of the theory. In addition, according to a study 
about pro-environmental purchasing behaviour done with 1093 participants, the path between 
intention and actual purchase (behaviour) in their structural equation model was found to be weak 
(Mostafa, 2007). Given that Ajzen (1991, p.181 ) presumes that “Intentions are assumed to capture the 
motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to 
try….”, TPB may not be a very effective model in predicting pro-environmental behaviour. While there 
is a link between stated intentions and actual behaviours, it is often weak. 
 
Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) think that pro-environmental behaviour is so complex that it cannot be 
explained through one single framework or all encompassing model. Monroe (2003) suggests that a 
simple pro-environmental behaviour may consist of a few hidden actions. She used bike commuting as 
an example. Bike commuting may include finding the safest route, bringing spare clothes and spotting 
a place for clothes changing plus other possible considerations an individual has to make before he or 
she perform the behaviour (cycling). Each component could be a potential reward as well as a barrier. 
Therefore, pro-environmental behaviours consist of both pro-environmental intentions and practical 
reasons. In the study of commuting choice, Collins and Chambers (2005) found that there is an 
interaction between situational (practical reasons) and psychological (pro-environmental intention) 
factors when predicting pro-environmental behaviours. 
 
Some neurologists believe that many processes in the brain occur automatically and without the 
involvement of our consciousness. In such way, our mind is prevented from being overloaded by 
simple routine tasks. But when it comes to decisions, individuals tend to assume they are made by 
their conscious mind. Challenging such folk concept, Soon, Brass, Heinze and Haynes (2008) have 
unravelled how the brain actually unconsciously prepares our decisions. In their study, participants 
were asked to make their decision to press a button with their left or right hand. They were free to 
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make this decision whenever they wanted, but had to remember at which time they felt they had 
made up their mind. By monitoring the micro patterns of activity in the frontopolar cortex which is 
part of the presupplementary motor area of the brain with fMRI, they attempted to find out what 
happens in the brain in the period just before the person felt the decision was made. After analysing 
the micro patterns, they discovered that they are able to predict the decision. More importantly, they 
discovered that there were significant time differences between the moment the brain signal was 
recorded and the moment the participants reported their decisions were made. In the most extreme 
case, the brain activity recorded was 7 seconds ahead of reported time. The result implies that 
decisions are unconsciously prepared before individuals are aware of that occuring. 
 
Affect Heuristic 
 
Regarding the low prediction of pro-environmental behaviours with existing models, Hine et al. (2007) 
suggest that factors other than cognitive determinants have to be considered. Based upon Zajonc’s  
(1980) Affective Primacy Hypothesis and the findings of Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000), 
Hine et al. (2007) conducted a study on wood burning heater users. Significant results in the prediction 
of policy support plus behavioural switching resulted when the factor of affect is included in the model 
(Hine et al., 2007). 
 
It was not very common to study pro-environmental behaviours as products of decisions making 
processes (Kollmuss, & Agyeman, 2002). Hine et al. (2007) attempted to portray pro-environmental 
behaviours as products of pro-environmental decisions. They measured the affect level of the 
residents of Armidale, Australia towards wood fire heaters in order to predict their decision in support 
of the new policies that control wood fire heaters (Hine et al., 2007). Besides Hine et al. (2007), Wilson 
and Dowlatabadi (2007) also, suggest that it is important for researchers to understand how 
individuals make their decisions before they design their intervention model in their energy 
consumption study. 
 
For centuries, how decisions were made was regarded as a rational cognitive process, mainly by 
philosophers (Sayeg, Anthony, & Perrewe´, 2004). However, nothing had been done to find out the 
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potential contribution of emotions even when it was believed that the less involvement of emotion, 
the better the decision to be made would be (Descartes, 1994). Nevertheless, publications of 
researches that were intended to find out the possible weight of emotions in the procedure of human 
decision making were rare despite common sense suggesting emotions are among the factors in 
human decision making (Pérez Nieto, Fernández-Abascal & Miguel-Tobal, 2009). 
 
. 
Affective Primacy Hypothesis 
 
Robert Zajonc (1980) was among the first to challenge the traditional models which proclaim that 
affect is post-cognitive, in which the overall affective judgements can only be generated after the 
objects are cognized and evaluated. He argues that affective reactions towards an object or a situation 
often surface even when there is no given information of such object or situation for accomplishing a 
cognitive or thought process. Based on his observation to the formation of social perceptions, he 
argues that instance judgement to a stranger is natural and unavoidable. He further applied this 
observation to the formation of impressions other than social perceptions by introducing the example 
of people’s response to a house that people do not just see a house but a handsome or an ugly house. 
One remarkable aspect of first impressions (affective reactions) of persons or objects is their 
immediacy. We know within a fraction of a second whether we like the person or not when we meet a 
stranger. Such reactions are instantaneous and automatic. Judgements are often accompanied by 
affective reactions that cannot always be voluntarily controlled. We might be able to control our 
expression of an emotion but are not able to control whether we want to experience an emotion or 
not. It is difficult for us to escape the reaction that the person impressed us as being pleasant or 
unpleasant. Since affective judgments are inescapable, they cannot be focused as easily as cognitive 
processes. For such a reason, affect may play a more important role in decision making than we are 
willing to admit. He suggests that a decision could be made without any prior cognitive process as he 
believes that an animal’s first level of response to the environment is affective. The initial decision is a 
simple rule of adaptation which is to either initiate approach or avoid behaviour. Zajonc (1980) 
believes that affect is among the first links that eventually differentiated animals from plants in the 
evolution of complex adaptive functions. 
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In fact, Zajonc (1980) believes that affective reactions are the dominant reactions of lower organisms 
to stimuli. Even for higher organisms, affective reactions are still, most of the time, their first reactions 
to stimuli. Higher organisms (for example, people) are able to like something or be afraid of it before 
they know precisely what it is and perhaps even without knowing what it is. He argues that even 
higher organisms rely on such simple reactions in order to handle their daily tasks. He used a 
hypothetical example of a rabbit avoiding a snake attack to demonstrate how affective reactions 
function better than a complex cognitive processing system and the major reason is that affective 
reactions are potentially fast. He also argues that cognitive processing often consumes more energy 
than affective reactions. Since it is such a well functioning system, Zajonc (1980) believes that the 
affective system operates most of the time independently of the cognitive system. However, the two 
systems are not totally independent; at any point of a cognitive process, feelings (affective reaction) 
may be aroused. Meanwhile, there may be new feelings (affective reactions) after some cognitive 
activities have been executed. In his original words “In nearly all cases, however, feeling is not free of 
thought, nor is thought free of feelings.” (Zajonc, 1980, p.154 ). 
 
Feelings are always there even when we are not aware of it. Such affective reactions are difficult to 
verbalize, yet people and other higher organisms are able to communicate their affect through 
nonverbal channels efficiently (postures and gestures). Zajonc (1980) argues that people often select 
the information they collected for justifying their decisions after they were made. 
 
Another suggestion by Zajonc (1980) is that people are not easily moved to reverse their initial 
affective impression of a person or of an object. This makes affective judgement almost irrevocable.  
People are always ready to admit the fact that they have done their cognitive analyzing wrongly but 
they know that they will never be wrong about what they like or dislike (affect trumps reasoning). Such 
stubbornness in initial decisions is the reason Zajonc (1980) believes cognition-based prediction 
models may be prone to error. This may be a plausible reason TPB is not highly effective in explaining 
pro-environmental behaviour. While the TPB has room for affect in it, the role is indirect and after the 
person has reasoned about their attitudes and beliefs. 
 
Somatic-Marker Hypothesis 
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Damasio (1994) who was inspired by his findings from the Iowa gambling task (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) proposed the idea of the somatic-marker hypothesis. Damasio and 
colleagues tested his hypothesis with patients who suffered from brain damage in the orbitofrontal 
cortices.  Patients who suffer damage in orbitofrontal cortices are not able to experience emotions. 
Participants who are healthy were able to choose cards advantageously before they realized which 
strategy was best while the patients were not able to choose cards advantageously even after they 
have figured out the optimal strategy. By measuring the skin conductance level of participants, 
Bechara et al. (1994) discovered that participants without brain injury started experiencing negative 
emotions when choosing the wrong cards after the first ten rounds. They were able to choose the 
correct cards after fifty rounds. However, it was only after around eighty rounds when participants 
were able to explain the pattern they observed. The most important result of their study is that 
patients suffering from orbitofrontal injuries (who do not experience any emotions) are not able to 
make correct decision even after they have spotted and were able to explain the pattern they  have 
observed. Without emotions, those participants were not able to act or decide according to the 
knowledge they have learned. Such finding supports Damasio’s argument is that without emotions, 
humans are not able to make appropriate decisions. Another way to describe it is that feelings could 
be an integral component of rational decision making (Zimmerman, 1996). 
 
One of the key ingredients in Damasio’s (1994) idea is the belief that the mind is embodied in the body. 
Not just the brain itself but the interconnections with other organs as well. It can be described as a 
complex circuitry connecting the brain and the entire body. Neurons are connected to the terminals all 
over the body of an organism. They control one’s instincts. Damasio uses the example of the instinct to 
eat which is the consequential action of such instinctual regulation of maintaining the blood sugar level 
inside an animal’s body to illustrate the mechanism. Such a regulation system is a survival mechanism. 
In Damasio’s (1994) words “saving your body”(Damasio 1994 p.116). The body initiated the signal. The 
signals are being processed by the regulation system and finally actions being taken by the body. It is a 
“pre-organised mechanism” that keeps an organism alive. The mechanism is also able to deal with the 
environment, which means an organism is able to take corresponding actions that perception of bodily 
states allows an organism to classify an experience as “good” of “bad” based on what effect it causes 
in the body. Any circumstances that lead to positive feelings to the body would be regarded as good; 
while anything that causes harm to the body would be felt as bad. The advantage of such a biological 
regulation system is that it is highly physical which allows simple organisms to learn the skills of 
survival rapidly. In simple words, the brain is, most of the time, an instinct regulation mechanism. 
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With an increase in brain capacity, higher level organisms equipped with such instinctual systems are 
capable of extending the circumstances in which these mechanisms operate, so they extend beyond 
situations directly relevant to survival. Damasio (1994) suggests that even complex social behaviour of 
people, traces back all the way to instinct regulation.  Damasio’s (1994) idea coincides with Zajonc’s 
(1980) suggestion that affective reaction is the first stage of reaction to a stimuli of an organism 
mentioned above, which is purely physical. Somatic markers help animals to choose the best option, 
highlighting those options which are best and worst relative to the body. The best option, naturally, 
would be that which most likely leads to survival and pleasure where long term gratifications are less 
likely to be included (Zimmerman, 1996). 
 
Affect Heuristic Model 
 
Based on the work of Zajonc (1980) and Damasio (1994), Finucane and colleagues (2000) introduced 
the notion of an affect heuristic, in order to give a more equal footing to the influence caused by affect 
with the cognitive weighing of risks on decision making. They attempt to construct a model in which 
images of objects or settings are tagged as positive or negative and are stored in human memory as an 
“affective pool”. During the process of decision making, ‘records’ from the affective pool are retrieved. 
In simple words, when a decision is being made, the brain will first retrieve the record of the 
corresponding topic and simply assesses the affective pool for the object or setting. This is a mental 
short-cut and Finucane et al. (2000) label it as affect heuristic judgement. Their model describes 
decision making as a process governed by two entirely different systems. The first system is a quick 
process, which involves little conscious input and is automatic (affective) which they call an 
experiential system; while the second system employs a series of conscious evaluations of risks and 
benefits (cognitive) which they call it an analytic system. Naturally, the experiential system is a quick 
and low effort system and is reckoned to be the default system in decision making (Hine et al., 2007). 
Such a system requires very little or no conscious input from the decision maker and is automatic. 
 
Since both analytic and experiential systems are valid in a person’s mind, Finucane et al. (2000) 
conduct a two part study in order to ascertain if the affect heuristic is involved in decision making 
processes.  In the first part of the study, participants were given a series of topics in which level of risks 
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and benefits are directly proportional to each other. That means the level of risks is positively 
correlated to the corresponding level of benefits. One of the items used in the study was roller blading 
which is an activity that brings entertainment (benefit) but with the chance of injury (risk). The 
rationale for Finucane et al. (2000) to introduce the notion of risk and benefit is that the two perceived 
factors are quantitatively mirroring each other on the opposite sides of the balance even though 
sometimes they are qualitatively different. In the roller blade case, entertainment is very different 
from potential injury qualitatively but the participants were expected to be able to compare them 
quantitatively. Under normal circumstances, level of risk and level of benefit of those events are 
positively correlated with each other. If people are judging the situation with the analytic system, they 
will presumably be rating the risk and benefit at similar levels. 
 
The participants were assigned into two groups where one group has to rate the risks and benefits 
level of each item within a limited time. The other group were required to perform the same task 
without time limit. The risk and benefit perceptions of the group given limited time were found to be 
significantly negatively correlated. That supports their hypothesis that the experiential system is the 
quicker process in decision making. In the second part of the study, four different kinds of information 
designed to manipulate affect were provided to the participants. Information was given which 
increased or decreased the perceived benefit or perceived risk.  Their results support the theory. Risk 
and benefit are apparently derived by reference to an overall affective evaluation of the stimulus item. 
 
From Finucane et al.’s (2000) finding, it is known that risks and benefits are assessed not only from 
rationale cognitive analysis but also include embodied affective tags as well. They are physical feelings 
similar to pain or joy which people can feel when they are using them to make decisions. In order to 
find out how affect works in the decision mechanism, Hine et al. (2007) went beyond Finucane et al.’s 
(2000) finding by measuring the level of affect directly. They measure the affect by first asking people 
to give three thoughts about wood fire heating which indicate the affective response (associations) 
towards wood fire heating. Hine et al. (2007) built a predicting model that uses the affect and risk and 
benefit of a wood fire to predict the level of policy support. The result supports their hypothesis that 
the affective associations would moderate the relationship between risk perceptions and policy 
support. 
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Finucane et al.’s (2000) study on affective pool has one important implication which was seldom 
mentioned – affect should not be bounded by the verbalised concept of risk and benefit. In Zajonc’s 
(1980) original framework, affect is beyond the boundary of semantic knowledge. He suggests that 
affect could be transformed into visceral or muscular symbols instead of direct verbal referents. It is 
for such a reason, Zajonc (1980) believes that it is important to remember that sometimes, the verbal 
or other cognitive representations that accompany the corresponding affective experience are often 
imprecise and ambiguous. Therefore, the level of risk measured in Finucane et al.’s (2000) study is 
almost certainly not the actual risk level in the mind of the participants. Such a risk level is only the 
imprecise representation of a participant’s feeling towards the given topic. In other words, affect is the 
actual judgement of an animal to a stimulus while the verbal descriptions are the distorted signals. 
That is what exactly affect is - a simple representation of the summary of preference, perceived risk, 
analysed risk, perceived benefit and calculated benefit etc. (Finucane et al., 2000; Finucane et al., 
2003). The unknown mechanism was being described as a dance of affect and reason (Finucane et al., 
2003). 
 
Despite the work of Zajonc (1980), Damasio (1994) and Finucane et al. (2000), there are very few 
studies including affect in decision making, though the number of studies has quickly increased since 
the early 2000’s (see Pérez Nieto, Fernández-Abascal & Miguel-Tobal, 2009). Since the perceptions of 
benefits and risks are the inaccurate representation of the original affect we experienced, it would be 
necessary to investigate the method to measure affect directly in order to develop a more accurate 
prediction model of affect heuristic. However, there is not a solid definition for affect in a heuristic 
model. Even Finucane et al. (2003) admit that affect does not have a precise definition among 
researchers in the field of emotion. While Zajonc’s (1980) original framework excludes a lot of complex 
emotions; there seems to be many confounding and affect related variables that are difficult to include 
in a model. The affect heuristic is promising, but poses some real research barriers. 
 
Embodiment 
 
We still have to wait for some breakthroughs in technology that allows us to investigate the 
mechanism of how thoughts and feelings generate the affect tag together as proposed in the affect 
heuristic. However, the researchers above have a common suggestion that such affect tags are 
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embodied.  Indeed, Zajonc (1980) proposes the possibility that locus coeruleus is a network in the 
central nerve system and is capable of processing affect independently. Damasio’s (1994) somatic 
marker hypothesis suggests that emotions, including complex feelings, are processed by our nervous 
system which has evolved from the simple body regulating systems centred on the limbic system and 
its peripherals. 
Since affects (or feelings) are embodied, it is worth considering how affect states could be measured 
directly from bodily conditions.  According to Mauss and Robinson’s (2009) review on emotion 
measurement, there are over ten variables that reflect participants’ affect state. The physiological 
reactions caused by emotions involve the autonomic nervous system (ANS), which comprises 
sympathetic and parasympathetic branches, and these are generally associated with activation and 
relaxation. There are already many activities of various organs that have to be measured in order to 
analyse the affect states (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). This includes skin conductance level (SCL), heart 
rate (HR), blood pressure (BP), total peripheral resistance (TPR), and heart rate variability (HRV), etc. 
Another common variable – the amplitude of the eye blink can be measured with an electromyogram 
(EMG). Brain activities at any specific region can be measured by functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). All these measurements have to be performed in a controlled environment which 
limits the degree of freedom in methodology. 
 
Besides the complicated procedures for measuring physiological responses, Mauss and Robinson (2009) 
have pointed out an important aspect that the type of emotions cannot be identified merely by the 
measurements of physiological reactions. Some emotions cannot be readily identified by the 
physiological reactions they induced; Apter (1992) showed that both anxiety and excitement are able 
to trigger the same bodily reactions. Self-report is often the most direct and simple way to describe the 
valence of an emotion (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Yet, self-report may not always be accurate for 
reasons like the denial of emotions (Fiedler, 1998). External observation of facial and other 
physiological expressions may compensate the shortcoming (Mauss & Robinson, 2009) but the 
accuracy is challenged by Barrett (2011) who notes division among researchers concerning the relative 
influences of universal and cultural factors in the production of assume emotional facial expressions. 
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Since transient affect state is difficult to measure accurately with current technology, investigating the 
phenotypic personality trait could be an alternative method to find out how the body contributes to 
decision making. 
 
Testosterone is regarded as the major factor of male aggressive behaviour (Apicella, Dreber, Campbell, 
Gray, Hoffman, & Little, 2008). Moreover, there were researches showing that testosterone 
contributes to risk taking behaviour of both sexes (Stanton, Liening, & Schultheiss, 2011). 
 
Precisely, there are two types of testosterone which were found significant in predicting risk taking 
behaviours; they are the prenatal testosterone and the circulating testosterone (Stenstrom et al.,  
2011).  It is not known which type of testosterone contributes more; biologists have long debated the 
contributions of organization effect (prenatal testosterone) and activation effect (circulating 
testosterone during puberty) to the development of organisms but with no solid answer (Diamond, 
2009). Neave, Laing, Fink, and Manning (2003) found no evidence to support prenatal testosterone 
level may predict circulating testosterone level. Both types of testosterone remain independent factors 
in predicting risk taking behaviours. 
 
It is, however, difficult to measure circulating testosterone. One way is to measure it from the saliva 
samples collected from participants (Apicella et al., 2008). There is another factor that has to be well 
controlled when collecting samples of saliva which is the time of collection. Circulating testosterone 
level varies according to the environment; it was found that people generally have higher level of 
circulating testosterone in the morning (Coates & Herbert, 2008). Even postures were found to be able 
to elevate circulating testosterone level (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010). No research has been done 
about the right time that circulating testosterone level should be measured before the task. While for 
prenatal testosterone, instead of measuring it directly, a proxy makes the measurement simple. 
 
The postnatal 2D : 4D ratio (the ratio between the length of the second finger and the fourth ring 
finger) correlates negatively with high levels of foetal testosterone (in relation to foetal oestradiol 
levels) in the earlier measured amniotic fluid (Manning, J. T., Scutt, D., Wilson, J., & Lewis-Jones, D. I., 
1998), via the action of the Homeobox genes, which control the development of both the urinogenital 
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system including and fingers (Kondo, Zakany, Innis, & Duboule, 1997). Accordingly, the ratio serves as a 
retrospective marker of the level of circulating testosterone in utero, along with the individual’s 
sensitivity to testosterone (Breedlove, 2010). Therefore, 2D:4D ratio is a proxy of the level of prenatal 
testosterone exposure. 
 
As mentioned above, no evidence was found to support that prenatal testosterone level predicts 
circulating testosterone level. How prenatal testosterone influences the human body condition years 
later is not known yet. Nevertheless, numerous studies show that 2D:4D ratio correlates with risk 
taking behaviours (Coates, Gurnell, & Rustichini, 2009; Fink, Neave, Laughton, & Manning, 2006; 
Stenstrom, Saad, Nepomuceno, & Mendenhall, 2011). In the study of Stenstrom et al. (2011), the 
2D:4D ratio of the male participants was found negatively correlates with their risk taking scores across 
all five domains of the domain-specific risk-attitude scale. The five domains of risks are financial risk, 
health/safety risk, ethical, social and recreational risk respectively (Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002). There 
were debates among researchers about the coherence across the domains of risks (Hanoch, Johnson & 
Wilke, 2006; Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011). Bungee jumpers may manifest conservative decision 
making approaches in financial risk tasks (Hanoch et al., 2006). Schonberg et al. (2011) also point out 
that existing models, which have mostly been designed for predicting economic risky decision making, 
have limited success in naturalistic risk taking behaviour since ‘cold’ cognitive constructs still fail to 
capture fully what are largely emotional decisions. On the other hand, 2D:4D ratio correlates with 
various risk decisions and behaviours in a few studies. In Coates, Gurnell and Rustichini’s (2009) study 
of the performance of traders in the stock market, 2D:4D ratio was found to be a significant predictor 
of performance (profit) which is the opposite of one of the hypotheses that a risky decision will lead to 
great lost. In another study, 2D:4D ratio was found to correlate negatively with participants’ scores in 
sensation seeking (Fink, Neave, Laughton & Manning, 2006). In a study of Balloon Analogue Risk Task, 
participants with low 2D:4D ratio and exposed to a low social power condition were found to use 
riskier approaches (Ronay & Von Hippel, 2010). 
 
From the studies above, 2D:4D ratio is apparently a better predictor involvement in risky behaviours 
than traditional cognitive constructs. Yet, there is no explanatory model that describes the mechanism 
of prenatal testosterone level influencing a person’s behaviour years later. Coates, Gurnell and 
Rustichini (2009) suspect that early testosterone level may of sensitize a person’s body and brain in a 
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way that lead to the later effects. However, no longitudinal study about the influence of 2D:4D ratio in 
human development process appears to have been published. 
 
Only a few studies look at the 2D:4D ratio in younger participants. One study has compared the faces 
of a group of young male with ages aged 4 to 11 years (Meindl, Windhager, Wallner, & Schaefer, 2012). 
Participants’ faces were analysed according to their shapes and features. It was found that the 
masculinity of the face is negatively correlated to the corresponding 2D:4D ratio. The important 
implication of this study is that the association between 2D:4D ratio and facial robustness can be 
observed before puberty. Meindl et al. (2012) hypothesize that children who experienced higher 
prenatal testosterone may behave more competitively, which may fortell different life-history 
strategies. In a similar study, Burriss, Little and Nelson (2007) suggest that certain aspects of masculine 
facial development may possibly be associated with differing perceptions of the self by others. Those 
aspects are predictable before adolescence (Nute, Orth, Moss, & Orth, 2000). Furthermore, such 
differing perceptions of the self could be an important factor in a person’s development in terms of 
intra-sexual competition and mate acquisition (Burriss, Little, & Nelson, 2007). Therefore, such self 
perception could possibly be governed by factors that are established prenatally. 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, their masculine faces give those young males greater chances to be 
identified as masculine and risk-taking persons at the early stage of their life. In a study of adult female 
perception of adult male faces, it was found that females rated the faces of males with lower 2D:4D 
ratio to be more dominant and masculine. In another face perception study, masculine faces of males 
were being identified as aggressive especially by male viewers (Macapagal, Rupp, & Heiman, 2011). 
Being endorsed by the surrounding people as dominant and masculine, their behaviour might be 
shaped in certain ways. Unfortunately without longitudinal studies, the exact contribution of 2D:4D 
ratio to the development of young children’s personality traits remains unknown. 
 
Two 2D:4D ratio researches were done by asking participants to recall their childhood behaviour. In 
the study by Burton, Henninger, Hafetz and Cofer (2009), it was revealed that 2D:4D does not just 
correlate with current level of aggression, but the gender-typical childhood play throughout the 
development of females. Four questions were asked to evaluate the gender-typical childhood play.   
One of those questions was the frequency of engagement in rough-and-tumble play (rough-housing) 
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which we may regard as the primary level extreme sports. Another question was the amount of 
injuries (stitches was explicitly mentioned) the participants had during those childhood play episodes. 
Females with low 2D:4D ratio were found to have engaged in rough play significantly more often than 
females with high 2D:4D ratio during their childhood. There were no significant differences within the 
male group yet their average rough play engagement is found to be higher than females. If we apply 
the definition of risk taking (sensation seeking) by Zuckerman (1979), it is not difficult to see that those 
participants were displaying strong urges to experience risk taking games even though they do get hurt 
physically sometimes. Such an urge could be seen as an embodied affect tag caused by exposure to 
high level of prenatal testosterone. 
 
The second study involved a group of participants with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) and a 
group of unaffected participants (Hines, Brook, & Conway, 2004). CAH is a genetic disorder causing the 
overproduction of adrenal androgen including prenatal testosterone and was the cause of low 2D:4D 
(Brown, Hines, Fane, & Breedlove, 2002). The recalled childhood gender role behaviour was assessed 
with the Pre-School Activities Inventory (Golombok & Rust, 1993). PSAI was developed to assess 
participants’ interests in sex-typical childhood toys and activities with 24 items (e.g. enjoying rough-
and-tumble play, playing with vehicles, weapons, dolls, or jewellery). Female participants with CAH 
were found to recall more male-typical childhood play behaviour (Hines et al., 2004). Among males, no 
significant difference was found between CAH males and control males; yet, the average scores of 
both male groups are not lower than the average score of the CAH female group. 
 
Both studies above provide no explanation why prenatal testosterone level correlates with young 
female’s male-typical behaviour. The two studies, however, both show that such behavioural patterns 
have an early onset which to some extent, reflect the organizational effect of prenatal testosterone. 
With the relative high scores for male groups, we can only suppose the possibility of a ceiling effect. 
 
From the results of the above two studies, it is suggested that females with high exposure to prenatal 
testosterone tend to engage more in male-typical behaviours. Other studies of male-typical childhood 
play suggest that behaviour could be regulated by deferential socialization (Granié, 2010). In Granié’s 
(2010) study on preschoolers in France, it was found that female’s injury-risk behaviours declines with 
increasing age. With the indirect measures filled out by the preschoolers’ parents, Granié (2010) 
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argues that children’s behaviour conform to masculine and feminine stereotypes as their ages increase. 
Masculine stereotype conformity turns out to be a better predictor of risky behaviours than biological 
sex. Being recognized as masculine, i.e. being viewed by their parents as strongly adopting behaviours 
and personality traits that society attributes to the male sex, predicts risky behaviours in preschoolers, 
whatever a child’s sex is. So, risk taking is actually, or at least partially, the behaviour pattern being in 
accordance with the social stereotype one identifies with. 
 
Earlier, Granié (2009) had already conducted a study of adolescent pedestrians. The results showed 
that risky behaviours among pedestrians can be predicted by masculine sex-stereotype conformity, 
which leads to a weaker internalization of traffic rules. Females tend more than males to internalize 
rules related to risky pedestrian behaviours. Granié (2011) then conducted another study on the 
gender stereotypes associated with driving among adolescents (age 10 to 16). It was found that male 
drivers are viewed as better drivers (compared with females) but at the same time they are viewed as 
careless and offending. There is also a general increase with age in the negative image of female 
drivers. In another traffic related research study, this time completed on the campus of the University 
of Liverpool, males were observed more often than females to cross busy roads when it is risky to do 
so (Pawlowski, Atwal, & Dunbar, 2008). Males were also found more likely to initiate a crossing in high 
risk conditions. 
 
From the above research, it is not difficult to find a consistent message – risk taking behaviours in 
transportation is regarded as masculine by society. For those who are masculine and at the same time 
want to be identified as masculine, we predict greater engagement in risky behaviours on the road. 
The 2D:4D ratio may be an embodied marker of socialized masculinity. In addition, in a study involving 
young males in the age range 10 to 17 years, it was found that the participants with lower 2D:4D ratio, 
perform significantly better than those with higher 2D:4D ratio in short distance (50 metres or less) 
running (Manning & Hill, 2009). In another study, Manning, Morris and Caswell (2007) found that 
2D:4D ratio predicts the performance of endurance running; indicating that prenatal testosterone 
could be a significant determinant of aerobic metabolism. Also a study of both secondary and tertiary 
students found that those students with lower 2D:4D ratio achieve significantly higher grades in 
physical education (Hönekopp, Manning, & Müller, 2006).  They also have significantly higher exercise 
frequency (Hönekopp et al., 2006). Another study involving rowers also shows that 2D:4D indicates 
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cardiovascular efficiency as well as physical power among male rowers (Longman, Stock, & Wells, 
2011). 
 
The 2D:4D ratio may also be a marker for increased physicality. Perhaps, decision making for physical 
risky activities, is related to embodied traits. More radically, the decision itself, may be partially 
embodied (as in partially determined by physical traits). 
 
The Present Study 
 
Road cycling is a very dangerous activity. The U.S. customer product safety commission (2000) once 
published a report revealing that among the group of adults, age ranging from 35 to 54 years, there 
were over 60,000 cycling related injuries that require emergency treatment in the year 1998. It was 
the highest number of sports injuries in that year. If people are aware of the risk level of cycling, there 
has to be a very high benefit level to persuade people to make the rational decision to participate in 
cycling. The high number of cycling related injuries in relation to the number of cyclists suggests the 
general population should have a general concept of the danger of cycling. 
 
Besides being dangerous, cycling is also a physically demanding activity. According to a study done in 
Australia, males who commute on their bicycles are significantly less likely to suffer from obesity than 
males who commute in their cars (Wen & Rissel, 2008). LaChausse (2006) regard cycling as an 
endurance sport that requires regular training. 
 
In the current study, the decision to commute by bicycle or use some other form of transport was 
investigated using the framework provided by Hine et al.’s (2007) wood fire study. Additionally since  
Schwerdtfeger, Heims, and Heer’s (2010) study of male driving behaviour found the 2D:4D ratio to be 
correlated negatively with traffic violations, suggesting that prenatal testosterone may be determinant 
of males risky driving behaviour, 2D:4D ratio was also measured. We, therefore, combined elements of 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (attitudes regarding the belief in the benefits of cycling), the Affect 
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Heuristic (affective responses toward cycling), and the embodiment perspective (2D:4D) to predict 
both policy support for cycling and the actual choice to commute by bicycle. 
 
The first hypothesis of this study is that in the absence of considerations of physical risk and following 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour, it is predicted that  expressed levels of environmental concern will 
be positively correlated with the support level for policies that encourage bicycle commuting. 
 
The second hypothesis is that perception of cycling risk will be greater for those with more negative 
affect towards cycling. In addition, the  perception of cycling risk will be greater among females, and 
for those with higher 2D:4D ratios (indicating less exposure to testosterone during foetal 
development).    
 
The third hypothesis is that the relationship between 2D:4D ratio and the perception of cycling risk will 
be stronger for females than for males. Because males are more likely to be encouraged culturally to 
engage in physical risky behaviours, the relationship for 2D:4D and risk perception is likely to be 
attenuated in men due to ceiling effects in physical risk taking.  For females this will not be the case.  
  
The fourth hypothesis is that commuting by bike will be more prevalent among those with stronger 
expressed environmental concern, lower 2D:4D ratios and greater perceived risk of cycling.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
Eighty-one female and 66 male participants were recruited by the experimenter around the campus of 
the University of Canterbury with using convenience sampling. Chocolate bars were given as incentive 
for their contribution to this study. 
 
The sample consisted predominantly students or staff of the University of Canterbury. The mean age is 
21.3 years (S.D. = 5.35 yrs) ranging from 16 to 46 years. 
 
Materials and Measurements 
 
Materials used in this study include the questionnaire specially designed for this study, Perspex finger 
measuring tube, permanent marker, calliper, standard map of Christchurch city, information sheet and 
the participants’ consent form. 
 
Questionnaire 
 
A questionnaire inspired by the wood fire heating done in Armidale (Hine et al., 2007) was designed for 
this study. The current study included scales and item that assessed participants' affective associations 
with road cycling, perceived environmental benefits of cycling, perceived risks of road cycling, and the 
level of support for policies that promote road cycling. Participants' age and sex was also obtained. 
Participants' current bicycle commuting practice was also measured as a dichotomous variable. 
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Additional questions probed general cycling habits. In order to test the first hypothesis, an 
environmental concern scale is included in the questionnaire as the predictor variable. 
 
The Environmental Beliefs Scale developed by Collins and Chambers (2005) was adopted and slightly 
modified for this study in order to measure the environmental concern of participants, targeting their 
views towards their daily commuting. In order to help the participants to focus on cycling as an option 
of commuting, the scale was modified to suit the purpose (Cronbach Alpha = 0.751). It consists of 14 
items reflecting the level (1 to 5 scale) of various environmental beliefs. The grand total of the scores 
will be used as the predictor variable of the first hypothesis. 
 
Participants' level of support for pro-cycling policies (response variable) were assessed by the level of 
financial support they think is appropriate to promote cycling. Such level of financial support is 
measured by three main items which are, their willingness to invest in pro-cycling policies, the 
proportion of spending on pro-cycling policies among other daily council expenditures they would 
recommend, and the amount of money to be given to each cyclist as an incentive that they think is 
appropriate in order to reduce car usage. The first question of policy support was about the how much 
they will support the levy of $200 for each resident in Christchurch in a five-point Likert-type format (1 
= Strongly oppose, 5 = Strongly support). Participants were told that such levy is mainly for improving 
road cycling facilities in Christchurch.The second question of policy support was about how much they 
think the council should spend on pro-cycling policies. In a hypothetical scenario that $100,000 is to be 
granted for improvement of Christchurch city which participants have to recommend how the above 
funding should be distributed among five hypothetical projects. Finally, the third question was about 
incentive. By asking the participants to choose the amount of which they think are appropriate, among 
five options ranging from zero to $750, as monetary incentive to encourage cycling. 
 
The individual risk perceptions (response variable of the 2nd hypothesis and predictor variable of 4th 
hypothesis) were measured by asking them to rate how risky it is to cycle on the road (1 = not risky at 
all, 5 = very risky). 
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Participants’ affective associations with cycling on the road (predictor variable for 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
hypothesis) were assessed using the approach developed by Peters and Slovic (1996). With a simple 
highlighted cue phrase “riding a bicycle on the road within 10 seconds”, participants were required to 
list the first three thoughts or images that came to mind and to write them on the questionnaire. The 
reason participants were asked to finish this task within 10 seconds is to simulate the experiment 
condition of Finucane et al. (2000) that participants were asked to make their judgement within 
limited time. A set of 3 five-point Likert-type format scales ranging from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very 
positive) was used to rate the thoughts. The three affective response scores will be averaged to form a 
composite index of affect valence by the researcher. 
The complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Finger measuring tube 
The precision of measurement of fingers is an important factor of this study. Inspired by a recent finger 
length study done by Nicholls, Orr, Yates, and Loftus (2008), transparent Perspex tubes were used to 
measure the fingers’ length of the participants. Such method was adopted because it is a highly 
effective and easy-to-use method was developed to measure finger length up to the nearest 0.1 
millimetre. Each tube is 17 centimetre long with a diameter of 3.5 centimetre. (See Figure 1.) 
 
Figure 1     Illustration of the measuring tubes slipped over the fingers of the left hand. 
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Map of Christchurch 
 
The accurate (relatively) distance between home and workplace is measured by measuring travelling 
distance between the circled locations (+/- 200 meters) of home and workplace on the standard city 
map of Christchurch. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were encouraged to elicit three visual images about cycling on the road and were then 
asked to rate each image they gave on five-point scale with labelled endpoints. In order to reduce the 
chance of participants giving their images and the corresponding ratings from a non-associative 
manner, they were reminded to get the imaging part and the rating part done within ten seconds each. 
They were then left to finish the remaining of the questionnaire. 
 
Each participant’s second (index) and forth (ring) fingers’ lengths of both hands were marked with 
black permanent marker on their corresponding Perspex tubes. The marked fingers’ lengths were 
measured with a standard calliper with an accuracy +/- 0.05mm at a much later stage. Such 
measurement was inspired by the study done by Nicholls et al. (2008) which was designed to provide a 
quick and easy-to-use means of measuring finger length. Instead of using transparent tubes with mm 
scale printed on it, the lengths of fingers were marked on the tubes with a permanent marker which 
was measured with a calliper. This modification of the measurement method enabled the 
measurement to be made quickly in the field with less chance of error. Each participant’s 2D:4D ratio 
(predictor variable for 2nd, 3rd and 4th hypothesis) was calculated by dividing his/her second finger 
length by the fourth finger length. 
 
Finally, the participants were asked to circle roughly the location of their home as well as their normal 
work place on a given map of Christchurch city. 
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Results 
 
Policy Support 
 
In order to test the first hypothesis, a multiple regression was performed. The total of all environment 
concern scale questions was entered into the regression together with other predictor variables which 
include the average of the 3 ratings of the affective associations, sex of individual participants (female 
coded as 1 and male coded as 2) and the 2D:4D ratio. The response variable is the standard score of 
the 3 policy support questions. Environmental concern is found to be the only significant predictor 
variable (B=0.403, p<0.01). Details of the regression result is shown in table 1. The results show that 
participants who have high environmental concern scores (pro-cycling commuting attitudes) also have 
higher self-reported pro-bike commuting policy support. Therefore, the first hypothesis is supported. 
Such a finding is consistent with the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Participants who score high on 
environmental concern and pro-bicycle riding attitudes (e.g. see cycling as beneficial) choose to 
support policies which lead to a more environmental protected community (Armitage & Conner M. 
2001). However, the answer given in regards to policy support requires no actual obligations (the 
participant is not actually risking anything, except hypothetical money). 
Table 1       Summary of multiple regression analysis: affect, environmental concern, sex and 2D:4D ratio as 
predictors of bicycle promoting policies. 
Predictors         AdjR2             B    Std.Error 
Model .153**   
Affect  -.086 .059 
Environmental Concern  .403** .103 
Sex  -.006 .117 
2D:4D Ratio  -.045 .675 
** p<.01 
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Risk Perception  
 
In order to test hypothesis 2 and 3, a two-step hierarchical regression was performed. Affect, 
Environmental concern, Sex and 2D:4D ratio were entered as predictor variables into the first step of 
the regression while Risk perception was input as the response variable. In order to test hypothesis 3, 
both variables (Sex and 2D:4D ratio) were centred at zero and multiplied together to compute the 
interaction. The interaction was then entered into the second step of the regression as the predictor 
variable. The result is shown in table 2 and figure 2. Affect, Sex (Female coded as 1 and Male coded as 
2) and 2D:4D ratio were found to be significant predictors.  The mean risk perception among female 
group (M=3.65, SD=0.854) was higher than in the male group (M=3.26, SD=0.933), t(145)=2.663, 
p<0.01. The interaction between sex and 2D:4D was also significant. Correlation between cycling risk 
perception and 2D:4D ratio were tested for both Female and Male group. Among females, the 
correlation was not found to be significant (r=0.071, n.s.). Among males, the correlation was found to 
be significant (r=-0.271, p<0.05 2-tailed).  
 
 
Table 2       Summary of two-step hierarchical regression analysis: affect, environmental concern, sex, 2D:4D 
ratio and their interaction(sex & 2D:4D) as predictors of road cycling risk perception. 
Step   Variables           B      R2Change 
1 Affect -.258** .123** 
1 Environmental Concern .080  
1  Sex 2.352*  
1 2D:4D Ratio .292*  
2 Sex X 2D:4D Ratio   -2.33* .025* 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
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Figure 2     Scatterplot showing the moderation of the Main effects of Risk perception and 2D:4D ratio by sex. 
 
Actual bicycle commuting behaviour 
 
In order to test hypothesis, a logistic regression was conducted with affect, Environmental concern, 
Sex, 2D:4D ratio and Risk perception were entered into the model as the predictor variables. The 
actual bicycle commuting habit was coded as 0 (no) and 1 (yes) before being entered into the 
regression model. The result is shown in table 3 and figure 3. 
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Table 3       Summary of logistic regression analysis: affect, environmental concern, sex, 2D:4D and risk 
perception as predictors of bicycle commuting behaviour. 
Predictors          R2             B            SE        Wald        Exp(B) 
Model .169**     
Affect  -.264 .235 1.266 .768 
Environmental Concern  .902 .415 4.731* 2.465 
Sex  -.368 .436 .710 .692 
2D:4D Ratio  -5.469 2.707 4.082* .004 
Risk Perception  -.496 .223 4.938* .609 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
 
 
Figure 3     Interaction between Sex and 2D:4D ratio in the prediction of actual bicycle commuting behaviour. 
Other findings 
 
The mean commuting distance among female group (M=7.21, SD=6.90) and male group (M=6.535, 
SD=6.47), t(139)=0.602, n.s. However, the mean commuting distance among non-cyclists (M=7.713, 
SD=7.453) was longer than that of cyclists (M=5.314, SD=4.55), t(135)=2.367, p<0.05.  
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Discussion 
 
Policy Support 
 
The results show that participants who have high environmental concern scores (pro-cycling 
commuting attitudes) also have higher self-reported  pro-bike commuting policy support. Such a 
finding is consistent with the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Participants who score high on 
environmental concern and pro-bicycle riding attitudes (e.g. see cycling as beneficial) choose to 
support policies which lead to a more environmental protected community (Armitage & Conner M. 
2001). However, the answer given in regards to policy support requires no actual obligations (the 
participant is not actually risking anything, except hypothetical money). 
 
Risk Perception  
 
Cycling risk perception, which is significantly predicted by affect, sex and 2D:4D ratio and supports 
hypothesis 2. In the second step of the regression, a significant interaction was also found when the 
variable sex X 2D:4D ratio was added to the model. 
Since there was a ceiling effect in young boys’ childhood gender role behaviour in a previous study 
(Hines et al., 2004), an interaction between sex and 2D:4D ratio is expected in a specific way. The risk 
perception of the male group was expected to be stable (low variance) and with a low correlation with 
2D:4D ratio. For the female group, an inverse correlation between risk perception and 2D:4D ratio was 
expected. The results, however, support a different interpretation. Female participants’ risk perception 
levels seem not to be affected by their corresponding 2D:4D ratios, while for male participants, their 
risk perceptions correlate negatively with their 2D:4D ratios (see figure 2 in the result section). Perhaps, 
females are encouraged culturally to not perform physical risky behaviours and this suppresses the 
relationship between 2D:4D and risk perception amongst females. Whereas for males there is no 
cultural suppression of physical risk taking behaviour. Instead of a result due to a ceiling effect in risk 
taking amongst males, it may be instead due to a floor effect in the female group. This partially 
supports the hypothesis, but the mechanism is different than anticipated.  
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The possible explanation of such a difference could be caused by the possible differences in the 
formation of risk perception of the two sexes. Gustafson (1998) suggest in a review that risk 
perception could be socially and culturally constructed. In that case, the upbringing of a person may 
determine his/her risk perception to a specific item. In that case, we may take a closer look at Granié’s 
(2010) study. 
 
Granié’s (2010) study of preschoolers shows that among children of age 3 to 6, reported injuries 
decreases according to their age for both boys and girls while the injuries of boys remain higher than 
girls across their ages. The same study also found that the frequency of injury-risk behaviours is 
predicted by the conformity to male stereotype (masculinity scores) which is decreasing among 
preschool females and is increasing among preschool males.  
 
With no objection to the fact that Androgens contribute to the early injury-risk behaviours, Granié 
(2010) used the idea of Maccoby (1988) that sex-based segregation does not only stop girls from 
practicing masculine behaviours with boys; it also prevent girls from displaying masculine behaviours 
in front of their own group to explain her findings. In a similar way, boys are strongly discouraged from 
engaging in activities that go against the stereotype (Maccoby, 1988). 
 
The above findings explain the results of the current study that there is an interaction between sex and 
2D:4D ratio in the prediction of risk perception. It is the organization effect that high level of prenatal 
testosterone simply leads the young children, especially males to participate more in injury-risk 
activities. Through the participation of those activities, the children develop the skills which help to 
reduce the chances and consequences of getting injured.  
 
Besides developing the skills to avoid getting injured, frequent participation in risky activities may 
actually alter one’s risk perception. As risk perception is subjective and experiential (Deery, 1999) and 
involvement in a certain risky behaviour may not always lead to negative consequences, such as injury 
or penalty, that may increase the sense of competence (Horvath & Zuckerman,1992). In that case, risk 
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perception may be a consequence, not a cause of behaviour (Machin, & Sankey, 2008). Such an 
proposal is in line with Apter’s (1992) idea about “protective frame”. Apter (1992) describes protective 
frame as a flexible self-constructed buffer zone (sometimes by one’s skills) that allows a person to get 
close to the danger situation but confident enough he/she will not enter the trauma zone which is the 
potential negative consequence. Because of that, Ulleberg and Rundmo (2003) even challenged 
whether there is a causal relationship between risk perception and behaviour. 
 
Another important theory that Granié’s (2010) mentioned in her study was from the study of Hillier 
and Morrongiello (1998) about the risk appraisals of young children. It must not be forgotten that risk 
perception could be multi-dimensional.  
 
According to Morrongiello’s  (1998) finding, young boys and girls view risk in different ways. The risk 
rating by girls is better predicted by the vulnerability (“will I get hurt”) while the risk rating by boys is 
better predicted by the severity (“how hurt will I get”). Yet there are no significant differences 
between young boys and girls in rating the severity, vulnerability and overall risk assessment 
(Morrongiello, 1998). In a similar study, it was found that young boys attributed more injuries to bad 
luck, rated risk of injury as lower, and expressed more of an optimism bias than young girls 
(Morrongiello and Rennie, 1998). Besides the difference in young boys and girls’ appraisals to risk, 
Morrongiello and Dawber (1999) also discovered that parents generally have different standards for 
boys and girls. They found that parents prefer to remind their daughters about caution and safety 
while encouraging their sons to be risk taking. 
 
From Granié’s  (2010) suggestion that children’s behaviour conform to masculine and feminine 
stereotypes as their ages increase it is possible to surmise that adults’ preference towards certain 
behaviour are driven by the conformity to the gender they identify with. 
 
Road cycling is practically a dangerous activity but there is no evidence showing that it has been 
categorised as a male or a female activity. Bicycle manufacturers generally produce both male and 
female versions of products. According to historical account, there were bicycles designed for women 
back in the 1890’s (Bathurst, 2011). Women were not discouraged from travelling on their bicycles 
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even back in the nineteenth century (Willard, 1895). Unlike the rough childhood play measured in the 
previous studies (Burton et al., 2009 ; Hines et al., 2009) , there is no specific gender stereotypical issue 
for road cycling for females. Therefore, both males and females have similar chances to experience 
road cycling. With their experiences, males and females are both able to judge whether road cycling is 
the option they want to choose based on their experience rather than the approval of the society. 
 
However, there is a possibility that the risk perception of females of road cycling is influenced by social 
perception more than that of males. According to Granié’s (2010) finding, females reduce their 
masculinity scores and engage less in injury-risk activities as a result of the rejection of the 
stereotypical behaviours of the opposite sex. That may not be the result of the social stereotype 
towards female cyclists but the social stereotype towards female are in general more vulnerable. A 
study shows that even children rate girls as having a greater risk of injury than boys, although young 
boys routinely experience more injuries than young girls (Morrongiello et al., 2000). Therefore, 
females are not being discouraged to commute by bicycles but still carry the belief that they are more 
likely to get hurt. 
 
That may indicate the limitation of our current understanding of risk perception and decision making. 
There may be a gap between the risk perception and risk taking behaviour among individuals which we 
have never become aware of. Perhaps most of the risk studies show that females are more risk averse 
than males in both their perception and behaviour (e.g., Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Eckel & 
Grossman, 2002). There is one activity which is an exception and that is sun tanning (Sjöberg, Holm, 
Ullén, & Brandberg, 2004). Sun tanning is found to be more common among females despite the fact 
that females are more aware of the risk (Sjöberg et al., 2004). Sjöberg et al. (2004) regard that as the 
result of unrealistic optimism. 
 
In this study, there is not enough evidence to show which group is manifesting unrealistic optimism. 
But if we take a close look at the results, we might get some insights. The correlation between risk 
perception and 2D:4D ratio among female participants is insignificant (r = 0.07). For male participants, 
the lower the 2D:4D ratio, the lower the risk they perceived. 
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Female participants’ risk perception is significantly higher than that of the male participants (p < 0.01). 
Also, the S.D. of female group’s risk perception is 0.854, lower than 0.933 of the male group. As 
mentioned, the risk of road cycling is high, even when it is in terms of getting severe injuries. Yet, there 
is a correlation between the risk perception and the 2D:4D ratio among the male participants. It is 
possible that it is caused by the specific attitude of male towards risk taking. Hawkes (1991) introduced 
her show-off hypothesis which proposes that human male may gain respect from both sexes by 
engaging in risky hunting tactics despite the fact that hunting often is not the most efficient way to 
obtain food. Besides mate attraction which is a long term reward, human males with skills and courage 
at hunting or warfare sometimes may be granted sexual favours from females for their courageous 
acts and often their acts impress other males that he is a good person to have as a friend and hunting 
partner. With the support of other males, the chances of survival and the inclusive fitness of those 
males will increase. If we apply that to our bike commuting study here, it is possible males who 
commute by bike are displaying their fitness quality to both males and females. 
 
There are not many research studies that explore the mentalities of road cyclists. One of the studies 
done by LaChausse (2006) reveal that male cyclists were more likely to endorse competition than 
female cyclists while females were more likely to endorse affiliation and self- esteem as reasons for 
cycling. For bike commuters, there should be no obvious competitor but there is a possibility that male 
bike commuters see other road users (mainly drivers) as competitors. Studies of drivers’ behaviours 
show that the presence of passengers will increase the chances of a crash for young male drivers 
(Jackson and Gray, 1976; Doherty, Andrey, & MacGregor, 1998; Preusser, Ferguson, & Williams, 1998). 
Wilson and Daly (1985) regard this as the ‘young male syndrome’, suggesting that males have to gain a 
higher status to enable them to compete against older males of higher social rank and greater 
resources. Even the competitive manner of male cyclists may only happen during their adolescence, it 
may give them enough chances of exposure to risky cycling experience. Peterson, Gillies, Cook, Schick, 
& Little (1994) suggest that repeatedly experiencing near injury or minor injuries may lead to a child 
becoming desensitized to the possibility of severe injury outcomes. For children with low 2D:4D ratio, 
Meindl et al. (2012) hypothesize that they may experience different life-history strategies which shape 
their risk perceptions’ formation towards various daily activities. 
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Actual Commuting Behaviour 
 
The logistic regression of the actual cycling behaviour of the participants has shown that 
environmental concern, risk perception and 2D:4D ratio are the significant predictors of actual cycling 
behaviour. 
 
Among the predictors, 2D:4D ratio is the strongest one. Affect was in the prediction model but found 
to be insignificant. That is not in line with the findings of Finucane et al. (2000). However, if we revisit 
the idea of Zajonc (1980), Finucane et al.’s (2000) study could have forgotten the role of embodied 
feeling. As mentioned above, there have been numerous studies examining in the correlation between 
2D:4D ratio or testosterone and risk taking behaviours. However, no research examining the 
correlation between 2D:4D ratio and risk perception could be found. In the current study, 2D:4D ratio 
was found to be a significant predictor of risk perception. Revisiting the study by Finucane et al. (2000), 
affect guides perceptions of risk (Slovic & Peters, 2006). Such a concept was based on the idea of 
Zajonc (1980) which states that feeling is embodied. His idea is a direct foreshadowing of his later work 
on embodied emotion, and also his investigation on the vascular theory of emotion efference 
(Winkielman, 2010). 
 
Zajonc’s understanding about empathy is that people know one another through their emotional 
reactions and the process of knowing is the use of the motor system to encode and represent 
information (Niedenthal, Augustinova & Rychlowska, 2010). Challenging the mainstream ideas that 
cognitive representations are either in the form of either propositions or images, Zajonc and Markus 
(1984) think it can be in the form of motor processes. As they suggest that humans are capable of 
representing the emotional state of the others by facial mimicry (motor behaviour), emotions can be 
originated and operate noncognitively and unconsciously (Winkielman, 2010). 
 
If emotions can sometimes be unconscious, then human affective states will not be fully verbalised. 
However, from the implication of Finucane et al.’s (2000) finding, such embodied visceral states may 
alter human’s risk perception markedly. The finding of this study that 2D:4D ratio being a significant 
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predictor of risk perception may support Zajonc and Markus’s (1984) idea of such embodied and 
unconscious affect, although there are other explanations as well. 
 
Houwer and Hermans (2010) raised the daring question if feelings have a mind of their own after 
reviewing most of the subsequent research occurring after Zajonc’s (1980) publication. They suggest 
that in order to manage most of its daily tasks, it would be an effective option for an organism to 
develop an automatic affective processing system. Such a process is automatic and can be 
independent from higher cognitive processes thus making the entire process give us an impression 
that feelings operate like an intelligent being (Houwer and Hermans, 2010). 
 
One aspect of Zajonc’s (1980) idea worth deeper research is the embodiment of affective processing. 
As Zajonc (1980) suggests that in most cases, affects are encoded into visceral or muscular symbols 
rather than being transformed into semantic contents. Before complex brains were evolved, early 
organisms were already placed into circumstances where they had to make decisions on how to act 
when facing environmental challenges. In that case, we should ask the question if the body has a mind 
of its own. That means we should investigate if the body is capable of managing some of its daily tasks 
automatically without waiting for the brain to process the signals. Apparently, such a proposed mind is 
not the traditional Cartesian view of the mind; yet, in line with Damasio’s (1994) argument that the 
mind cannot be separated from the body, the role of the body has to be re-considered. 
 
It may not be an acceptable way to describe the body functioning as if it has a mind of its own. 
However, if we look at the body as a system with a well organised work procedure for handling many 
of the daily tasks without alarming the brain, it is not difficult to classify such a system as something 
having a pseudo-mind. Recently, some biologists even argue that intelligence has to be redefined so 
that there will be a category as plant intelligence. Plant neurobiologist Anthony Trewavas (2005) 
argues from a biological perspective that intelligence should not be limited to organisms with 
conscious minds.  He emphasises the fact that plants are capable of adapting according to their 
corresponding environmental challenges because of their phenotypic plasticity. Such phenotypic 
plasticity of plants is regarded to be equivalent to movement of animals (Trewavas, 2005). With such 
plasticity, a plant is then capable to adapt wisely in order to maximise its survival chance and forage for 
food and resources. This kind of adaptation process is similar to how a highly intelligent animal solve 
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its survival challenges as it includes sensory perception, information processing, learning, memory and 
choice (Trewavas, 2005). He further argues that plants should be regarded as prototypical intelligent 
organisms which initiated a serious debate, other biologists argue that plants have no neurons and 
therefore, it is not logical even to start considering the possibility of plant intelligence (Alpi et al., 2007). 
Such controversial idea has given old ‘Root-brain’ idea a chance to resurface (Calvo Garzo´n, P. & 
Keijzer, F., 2011). They argue that plants are able to make correct decisions even without a nervous 
system. Through a well developed but simple sensing system, plants are able to grow accordingly (not 
randomly) in order to survive. Carnivore plants are even able to ‘hunt’ without a brain (Krol E. et al., 
2012). In simple words, plants are able to take the correct actions rather than telling the outside world 
the correct answers and plants have been playing this survival game successfully. 
 
Zajonc (1980) changed the paradigm that decision has to be made thought rational information 
processing. Following the logic of the biologists above, I argue that our body has the ability to by-pass 
the conscious mind and make the correct decision (take the correct actions) under certain 
circumstances. From the results of the current study, there seems to be a possibility that the 
participants’ bodies were making their decisions to take corresponding actions rather than through 
cognitive functions. Their bodies were taking action according to the information they could collect 
while their minds were giving social-cognitive answers to the researcher. 
 
Such capability may not fulfil all the definitions of intelligence, but may certainly be able to influence 
the decision making of an organism. The influence I use here is not bounded to some facts that have to 
be considered during the cognitive process. The influence here means the body may send out strong 
signals to the entire system instructing itself how to act. Such an automatic system is effective yet 
flexible. The body is able act on its own and at the same time consult the higher-brain areas (or mind) 
or at least let the brain learns what it has done.  
In the regression model, the 2D:4D ratio may be considered an indirect measurement of the somatic 
response to the formation of risk perception of road cycling. Such a compromised method was 
adopted because the technology of measuring all related somatic responses towards a certain stimulus 
is yet to be developed. Moreover, the interpretation of physiological reactions to emotions is under 
development. Both excitement and anxiety are very different experiences; yet they lead to identical 
physiological reactions (Apter, 1992). In the current study, the 2D:4D ratio – the proxy of prenatal 
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testosterone was allocated to the regression model to test the individual differences of participants’ 
somatic tolerance to risk. We may presume that the 2D:4D ratio is a marker of the baseline of how the 
human body perceives and judges how risky a situation is, even before the brain has actually attained 
any knowledge about the situation. As Zajonc (1980) suggests ‘Preferences Need No Inferences’, an 
organism is able to make judgement to a certain situation even without any corresponding information. 
He suspects that the locus coeruleus – a network in the central nervous system is able to process affect 
independently. If so, then besides the somatic marker proposed by Damasio (1994), there could well 
be a rapid somatic response system to support human in handling some of their daily tasks. 
 
By comparing individuals’ 2D:4D ratio, we are able to know how the differences in their bodies 
reaction or judgement to a situation. From the previous studies mentioned in the introduction section, 
it is known that 2D:4D ratio is negatively correlated to various types of risk taking behaviours. While 
we are very far from understanding why 2D:4D would impact bike commuting decision making, the 
relationship is intriguing. Whether 2D:4D is a somatic marker of risk tolerance or an indicator of 
physical ability (as some studies do find a correlation between 2D:4D ratio and physical ability), it may 
influence the decision to commute by bike. At the very least, psychologists should not forget people 
have bodies, that they vary in shape and form, and that this makes a difference in decision making, 
especially those decisions involving physical risk. This suggests theories of decision making, for 
example the Theory of Planned Behaviour and the Affect Heuristic, could be augmented in some cases 
with direct somatic information.   
Limitation 
 
This study is about commuting. There are many practical reasons that a person has to consider before 
making the decision. It is not possible to compare the weight of those reasons as individuals have 
different preferences. For some people, carrying more than 5 kg may already deter them from bicycle 
commuting. 
Future Development 
 
2D:4D ratio is a proxy of the body and in the current study, it was used to represent the expected 
affective responses. It is suggested that affective responses be measured directly. Instead of asking 
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participants to rate the affective associations, let the participants imagine the situation and report the 
valence. The feeling can be measured by electronic equipment and various physiological metrics. 
Participants in this study live in different sections of the city. If possible, temporary accommodation 
could be provided in order to find out how people act differently under the same environment. Or, 
recruit participants from the same neighbourhood. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This is the possibly the first study that attempted to combine the somatic response, affect, risk 
perception and perceived reward in one model to predict risk taking behaviour. Traditionally, 
psychologist attempted to compare all the factors in a linear scale –balancing between feelings and 
cost and benefits. Maybe it is time we should start searching for the means to measure the non-verbal 
feelings which we believe to be playing a significant role in human judgements and decision making. 
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Appendix A : Questionnaire 
Bicycle riding and use questionnaire 
 
1. List 3 thoughts/images that come to your mind about riding a bicycle on the road within 10 
seconds.   
a.________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
b.________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
c._________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rate the above thoughts/images on a scale from 1 to 5 within 10 seconds accordingly. 
 
a. 1 2 3 4 5 
Very negative Neutral Very positive 
 
b. 1 2 3 4 5 
Very Negative Neutral Very Positive 
 
c. 1 2 3 4 5 
Very Negative Neutral Very Positive 
 
2. Imagine you live close enough to your workplace/university and are fit enough to ride a bicycle, 
will you use a bicycle for commuting when the weather is fine?  Please make your decision within 20 
seconds. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Very unlikely Very likely 
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3. The average cycling distance of commuters in Christchurch is around 5km. What is the greatest 
distance you think you are capable of cycling regularly to university/work? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Much less than 5 km Exactly 5 km Much more than 5 km 
 
4. If the government were to charge each person $200 per year for maintaining a safe and extensive 
bike path system, how would you respond to this? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly oppose Strongly support 
 
5. If the Christchurch City Council had received a $100,000 grant from the government for 
improving Christchurch, how would you like to see the money distributed to six potential projects 
(please do not exceed $100,000): 
 
1. Attracting new business                  $ _____________ 
2. Increasing tourism                 $ _____________ 
3. Reducing wood smoke pollution   $ _____________ 
4. Improving cycle ways    $ _____________ 
5. Improving other community services  $ _____________ 
6. If monetary incentives could improve the relative use of cycles versus cars, how much do you 
think the government should give to those who reduce car usage and use bicycles instead as a credit?   
(Please circle the answer you think is most appropriate).  
 
1. $0  
2. $100  
3. $250  
4. $500  
5. $750  
 
7. How risky do you think it is to cycle on the road? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Not Risky at all Very Risky 
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8. Using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) please indicate the extent to which 
you agree with the following statements. Place a number in the space provided to the left of each 
statement. 
 
______a. Through my individual actions I can make a difference to the environment. 
 
                    ______b. My individual actions have an impact on the environment when I choose which mode of 
transport to use to get to university/work. 
 
______c. The effect of air pollution from cars on public health is minimal. 
 
______d. It is necessary to conserve fossil fuels (such as petrol and natural gas) for future 
generations. 
 
                 _____e. Using a bicycle can reduce greenhouse gas emissions that affect people all over the world due 
to global warming. 
 
______f. Using a bicycle does not create as much noise as a car.  
 
______g. The noise created by cars negatively affects me. 
 
______h. This city would be a more pleasant place for me to live if there were fewer cars on the road. 
 
______i. Bicycle riding has a positive effect on my health. 
 
______j. Today’s car use will have a negative effect on me and my family in the future. 
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                      _____k. The contribution to reducing pollution by using a bicycle is negligible compared to that due 
to industry. 
 
______l. The positive effects of bicycles on the ecosystem have been exaggerated. 
 
______m. Drilling for liquid oil poses a threat to the environment. 
 
______n. Over the whole earth, pollution from cars has a minimal impact on plant and animal life. 
 
 
 
 
9. Do you currently use a bicycle to commute from home to university/work ?                         Y/N 
10. How far do you live from the university/workplace?                  Approximately  ________  km 
11. How many hours each week do you spend cycling ?                  Approximately  ________  hours.   
Please circle the purpose(s)  (You may circle more than one item or none.). 
a. Commuting 
b. Leisure/Sport 
c. Others 
12.  For your answer to Q.11 , please estimate the percentage for each. 
 
a. Commuting  ______ % 
b. Leisure /Sport  ______ % 
c. Others  ______ % 
 
13. What percentage of commuting trips do you travel by (please fill in the relative percentage; the 
total should be 100% ). 
 
1. car         ______% 
2. city bus        ______% 
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3. walking        ______% 
4. cycling        ______% 
5. other modes of transport      ______% 
 
14. Do you intend to use a bicycle for commuting more often in the future? 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Very Likely 
 
 
 
15. Are the following conditions significant in your decision in Q.14 above? 
 
a. Too far  Y/N 
b. Carry too many things  Y/N 
c. Have to go somewhere far away before/after work/uni?  Y/N 
d. Cannot (not skilful enough) to ride a bike  Y/N 
e. Don't have a bicycle/helmet (or bike is broken) Y/N 
f. Physical constraints  Y/N 
g. Prefer using buses  Y/N 
h. Someone offers me a lift  Y/N 
i. Giving someone a lift Y/N 
j. Helmet ruins the hairstyle Y/N 
k. Never bother to consider cycling  Y/N 
l. Others (please 
specify)_________________________________________________________________ 
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16. AISS – Intensity subscale 
 
Using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) please indicate the extent to which you 
agree with the following statements. Place a number in the space provided to the left of each 
statement. 
 
______ a. When the water is very cold, I prefer not to swim even if it is a hot day. 
______ b. When I listen to music, I like it to be loud. 
______ c. I stay away from movies that are said to be frightening or highly suspenseful. 
______ d. If I were to go to an amusement park, I would prefer to ride the rollercoaster or other fast 
rides. 
______ e. I would never gamble with money, even if I could afford it. 
______ f. I like a movie where there are a lot of explosions and car chases. 
______ g. In general, I work better when I’m under pressure. 
______ h. It would be interesting to see a car accident happen. 
 
 
Your Age : _____________ 
 
Your Gender :  Female / Male 
 
Left hand 
Length of 2nd finger :  ________________                   Length of 4th finger : ________________ 
 
Right hand 
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Length of 2nd finger :  ________________                   Length of 4th finger : ________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Experimenter only 
 
Initial Cycling distance    ___________  km Uphill?  Y/N 
 
Follow up questions (5 weeks later) 
 
FQ1. Cycling  (commuting)? Y/N FQ2. How many days a week?   
____________ 
FQ3. Address changed? Y/N FQ4.Further/Closer  
FQ5. Other reasons 
 
FQ6.  Do you intend to use a bicycle for commuting more often in the future? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Very Likely 
 
Remarks : 
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Appendix B : Human ethics approval 
Ref:  HEC 2009/LR/92  
 
 
 
16 October 2009 
 
 
Tak Woo 
Department of Psychology 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
 
Dear Tak  
 
Thank you for forwarding to the Human Ethics Committee a copy of the low risk application you have recently 
made for your research proposal “Cycling to work: a rational choice or an affect heuristic decision?”.   
 
I am pleased to advise that this application has been reviewed and I confirm support of the Department’s 
approval for this project. 
 
With best wishes for your project.  
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Dr Michael Grimshaw 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee 
University of Canterbury  Department of Psychology 
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Appendix C : Information Sheet 
Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate as a subject in the research project. The aim of this project is to 
investigate the correlations between people’s affect, risk perception, and decision making. 
Throughout the project, you will remain anonymous. You will be required to fill in a 
questionnaire with some personal information, which are the lengths of your fingers, the 
distance between your home and your work place, and your contact details. All records of 
your contact details will be securely destroyed in about 5 weeks after a few follow up 
questions are answered. The entire procedure should take approximately 20 minutes. 
All information given by you and the application will not bring you any foreseeable risks. 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time, including withdrawal of any 
information provided before the information stored anonymously. 
The result of the project may be published, but you are assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this study. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, 
information will be securely stored in the Psychology department at all time and non-
identifying information will be coded for anonymity. 
By completing the following questionnaires it will be understood that you have 
consented to participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results 
of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
This project is being carried out as part of a Master Thesis by Tak (T.C.) Woo 
(tcw30@uclive.ac.nz) under the supervision of Doctor William (Deak) Helton 
(deak.helton@canterbury.ac.nz). They will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have 
about participation in the project. 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee. 
 
